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Abstract: for the past 20 years, EMU institutions have sought to engineer a 
single safe asset that would provide a credible store of value for capital 
market participants. Before 2008, the ECB used shadow banking to create a 
single safe asset that we term shadow money, and in doing so also erased 
borders between Euro area government bond markets. Lacking appropriate 
ECB support, shadow euros could not withstand the pressures of the global 
financial crisis, and brought down several periphery euro government bonds 
with them.  Two new plans, the Capital Markets Union and the Sovereign 
Bond-Backed Securities, again turn to shadow banking, this time by using 
securitization to generate an entirely private safe asset or a public-private 
safe asset. Such plans cannot solve the enduring predicament of EMU’s 
bond markets architecture: that Member States have competed for investors 
(liquidity) since the introduction of the Euro, betraying a deep hostility 
towards collective political solutions to the single safe asset problem. 
Technocratic-led, market-based initiatives need to persuade EMU states that 
there is little threat to their ability to issue debt in liquid markets. Without 
ECB interventions, market-based engineering of single safe assets runs the 
danger of repeatedly destabilizing national bond markets.   
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It is hard to see how a more symmetric monetary system could emerge from 
a situation where only a couple of countries have debt that would be 
considered safe. 
 Landau (2016) 
 
The moneyness of safe assets is a good reason for central banks to 
care about safe assets. 
          Nowotny (2016) 
 
..almost all human history can be written as the search for and the 
production of different forms of safe assets. 
       Gorton (2016, p2) 
Introduction 
In November 2016, the ECB’s Benoit Cœuré (2016) made a remarkable 
speech on safe assets and sovereign debt in the Euroarea. This was not the 
often-repeated  ‘bank-sovereign diabolic loop’ warning that banks’ purchase 
of their home government bonds endangers financial stability by sanctioning 
fiscal indiscipline. Rather, Cœuré stressed that fiscal discipline alone would 
not translate into low, stable funding costs. Imperfect markets, he cautioned, 
played a critical role in the ratings downgrade experienced by several EMU 
countries since 2008. Wading into territory traditionally reserved to 
democratic politics, he warned that the (German) proposals for breaking the 
sovereign bank loop (caps and/or tougher risk rules on banks’ holding of 
sovereign debt) threatened more volatility and less room for countercyclical 
fiscal policies.  
 
Cœuré stressed the monetary role of sovereign debt. What bank money did 
for the real economy, Cœuré suggested, government bonds did for modern 
finance:  ‘we need public debt to be safe in the euro area. It is vital to the 
functioning of the financial system, analogous to the function of money in 
the real economy’. Sovereign debt has claims to ‘moneyness’, ‘since safe 
assets are becoming increasingly important as both stores of values and 
media of exchange’. Echoing recent literature on the monetary role of 
government debt in market-based finance (see Pozsar 2014, Gabor 2016, 
Gabor and Vestergaard 2016), Cœuré argued that similar to bank deposits, 
the moneyness of sovereign debt could be threatened during financial crises 
and required central bank support. Committing to stabilize sovereign bond 
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markets, as Draghi did in the July 2012, was therefore within the ECB’s 
mandate to manage money, rather then a violation of the monetary financing 
rule. But central banks’ involvement should go beyond crisis, he concluded. 
Since EMU states (read Germany) seemed unwilling to take responsibility 
for meeting the growing demand for safe assets, the ECB could step in, 
either through a permanently larger balance sheet or by issuing its own 
bills1. 
 
A 2017 ESRB working paper went further. It cautioned that Germany’s de 
facto position of safe asset issuer threatened EMU financial stability (van 
Riet 2017). Stability in a monetary union with freely flowing capital 
required a common safe asset that could be created by securitizing 
government debt (known as Sovereign-Bond Backed Securities, or 
SBBSies, see Brunnermeier et al 2011, 2016). Seemingly in agreement, the 
European Commission (2017) included a common safe asset in its White 
Paper on the future of the Euro, noting the potential of the SBBSies plans.  
In early 2018, a group of high-profile German and French economists 
reiterated calls for a safe asset as an important pillar of strategies to 
reconcile risk sharing and market discipline in the euroarea (Bénassy-Quéré 
A et al 2018).  
 
Remarkably, this emerging supranational technocratic consensus has little 
support in EMU countries. For European technocrats, the absence of a 
common safe asset impairs monetary policy and reduces fiscal policy space 
in periphery countries, as market participants find safety up north during 
periods of financial fragility. France under President Macron broadly shares 
this assessment. In stark contrast, most Member States, Germany in 
particular, view risk-sharing as a double sin: against fiscal responsibility and 
against democracy, since voters demonstrated little appetite for further 
integration. For instance, the German Academic Advisory Council to the 
Finance Ministry protested in early 2017 that SBBEies constituted an ill-
disguised attempt to ‘introduce Eurobonds through the back door’ 
(Handelsblatt 2017), attempt that may overturn Angela Merkel’s ‘over my 																																																								1	A	daring	an	extension	of	this	approach,	proposed	by	Khartik	Sankaran,	of	Eurasia	Group,	envisages	that	the	ECB	purchases	EMU	government	bonds	–	subject	to	so	strict	framework	to	ensure	that	EMU	governments	do	not	abuse	the	monetizing	powers	of	the	central	banks	-		and	issues	ECB	bonds	as	corresponding	liability.	This	would	require	a	formal	revision	of	the	ECB	mandate.			
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dead body’ opposition (Matthijs and MacNamarra 2015). Rather, the 
German vision is to transform the European Stability Mechanism into a 
European Monetary Fund, with more firepower to be deployed during 
periods of market stress against strict conditionality (see Ban and Schmidt 
2018). 
 
What is at stake in the debate on European safe assets? The European 
studies literature offers little insight. While bonds feature heavily in 
accounts of EMU crisis, developments in sovereign bond markets are 
typically interpreted as outcomes of  ‘real’ economy divergence feeding 
credit bubbles in periphery countries (Gros 2012, Copelovitch et al 2016); 
markets suddenly realizing the structural flaws of the Eurozone macro-
architecture, worsened by a lack of solidarity (Chang and Leblond 2015) or 
‘sound money’ ideas impeding the ECB’s intervention (Holmes 2014, 
Braun 2016a). At most, these accounts suggest that fiscal transfers are 
necessary to even out differences in economic competitiveness, thus 
strengthening  the monetary union (Howarth and Quaglia 2015). A notable 
exception, Jones (2016) rejects this common wisdom as distraction from the 
real challenge: a fully functioning Banking Union and a common risk-free 
asset.  
 
In this paper, we unpack the political economy of the common, or single, 
safe asset project. We define the single safe asset as an asset issued 
supranationally, that is, divorced from the fundamentals of, or market 
perceptions about, any one Member State. It instead reflects views of risks 
pertaining to the EMU. This asset remains safe as long as it credibly stores 
value. For instance, money created by the ECB (central bank reserves or 
base money) is such a single safe asset, albeit only available to banks.  
 
We depart from the prevailing view of bond markets as neutral signaling 
devices for broader political-economy developments (for international 
political economy) or vigilantes of fiscal discipline (for orthodox 
economics). Both fundamentally neglect how financialised globalization, 
increasingly organized around collateralized lending, has re-wired the 
relationship between (shadow) banks and sovereign debt (IMF 2012, Cœuré 
2016). Rather, we take seriously Minsky’s (1957) advice that money and the 
efficacy of central bank actions need to be re-examined during ‘periods of 
rapid changes in the structure or in the mode of functioning of financial 
markets’. To do so, we develop a critical macro-finance approach that puts 
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sovereign bonds at the core of its analysis of modern financial systems. This 
approach (a) treats finance as a global phenomena, increasingly organized 
around securities markets (Gabor 2018) and (b) debt/money as balance sheet 
relationships between (c) actors with distinctive temporal orientations and 
investment models (Lindo 2013, Peer 2016) (d) who rarely find safety in 
traditional bank money (Pozsar 2014), instead looking for it across borders, 
following the rhythms of global financial cycles (Rey 2015). Safety in this 
world is contingent on complex interactions between issuers and holders of 
debt instruments, whose temporal orientation matters for the creation and 
destruction of safe assets. Theoretically, critical macro-finance draws on a 
long tradition of treating debt and money as balance sheet relationships, 
tradition that goes back to Keynes, Minsky, Wray, Bell-Kelton and 
Mehrling (see Gabor and Vestergaard 2016) to reach the research offices of 
the Bank of International Settlements (Shin 2017) and of private finance 
(Pozsar 2011, 2014).   
 
The paper first engages the safe asset scholarship to single out the role that 
central banks play in drawing the contours of the safe asset universe, both 
by supplying safe assets and protecting privately-issued assets (Gourinchas 
and Jeanne 2012). It then argues that EMU needs a single, rather than a set 
of national, safe assets. This has posed complex political challenges since 
the inception of the euro. With little political appetite for a public single safe 
asset (Eurobonds), the only institution with epistemic authority to make the 
case for it in European capitals, the ECB, refused to do so. The grounds for 
central bank independence become shaky in a world where the case for a 
public single safe asset rests on the monetary power of sovereign debt. 
Instead, EMU saw several experiments of creating safe assets through 
markets, that is, of governing the complex monetary-fiscal-financial 
interactions through markets (see Braun et al Introduction to the special 
issue).  
 
Before 2008, the ECB engineered a single safe asset via repo markets, 
encouraging the creation of shadow money backed by any EMU sovereign 
bonds as equivalent collateral. Shadow euros strengthened the bank-
sovereign nexus, and planted the seeds of the sovereign debt crisis (Gabor 
and Ban 2016, Gabor 2016). The failure of shadow euros, in the absence of 
ECB support to support the monetary power of sovereign collateral, left 
Germany as de facto safe asset supplier, an exorbitant privilege ill-suited to 
its (ordoliberal) ‘black zero’ fiscal preferences (Matthijs 2015) or QE-
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induced shortages. Since the crisis, the plans for a Capital Markets Union 
and for SBBSies turn again to shadow banking, this time using 
securitization to generate an entirely private safe asset (STS securitized 
instrument) or a public-private safe asset (SBBSies). Such plans, however, 
cannot solve the enduring predicament of the EMU bond markets 
architecture. Since the introduction of the Euro, Member States have 
betrayed a deep hostility towards a collective solution to the single safe 
asset problem, hostility rooted in concerns for the liquidity impact on 
sovereign bond markets.  
 
Safe assets: a theoretical view  
 
Safe assets are defined as those debt instruments that provide economic 
actors with a store of value throughout good and bad times (Caballero et al. 
2017). Resilience to adverse systemic events is the elusive characteristic that 
marks out safe assets in the universe of debt instruments that includes cash, 
base money, bank deposits, tradable securities (sovereign and private), 
repurchase agreements and derivatives.  
 
The growing financial economics literature on safe assets explains the 
global financial crisis as an imbalance between the supply and demand for 
safe assets. Since the 1997 East Asian crisis, emerging countries 
accumulated large foreign currency reserves through trade surpluses and 
capital inflows, surpluses held in safe assets issued by the US government 
(Bernanke 2005, Caballero et al 2008), and to a lesser extent, by European 
governments (Caballero et al 2017). Yet supply failed to keep pace with 
growing demand. The structural shortage of government bonds created 
incentives for US shadow banking to manufacture private assets with a 
strong claim to safety, such as AAA securitized instruments. It also 
encouraged ‘naïve’ investors to treat debt issued by ‘fiscally weak’ euro 
area states as assets similar in safety to German government bonds 
(Caballero et al 2016). These claims to safety unraveled first in the US and 
then in Europe (Brunnermeier et al 2016), prompting scholars to theorize 
the determinants of safe asset status.  
 
Financial economics conventionally focuses on information sensitivity as 
the critical determinant of safety (Gorton 2016, Tri Vi Dang et al 2011). An 
asset is truly safe if new information about its characteristics does not 
change willingness to hold it, an attribute typically associated with (US) 
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government debt. Yet this approach assumes that safety is reliant on the 
characteristics of the issuer without specifying what exactly these 
characteristics should be - what Gelpern and Gerding (2016) term the 
‘suppercollider view of safe assets’, born in poorly understood natural 
processes. The supercollider view infers that due diligence would have 
prevented investors from deeming that asset safe in the first place. For 
instance, ‘naïve’ European investors suddenly realized that periphery 
sovereign debt was not safe (Caballero et al 2017).  
 
The exception, Gourinchas and Jeanne (2012) stress that central bank 
backstops are needed to preserve safety. This ‘safety is engineered’ 
approach is shared by legal scholars, heterodox economists and monetary 
historians, for whom safety is a fiction maintained by states operating with 
legal and political constraints (Dow 1996, Goodhart 1999, Boy 2014, 
Gelpern and Gerding 2016) and in response to evolutionary changes in 
finance (Minsky 1957, Gabor and Vestergaard 2016). This view has 
recently found support in the world of central banking (Cœuré 2016, Potter 
2018).  
 
Since safety is not intrinsic but engineered, how do we understand the 
evolving boundaries of the safe asset universe? An important analytical step 
from a critical macro-finance angle is to distinguish between two closely 
related but not entirely overlapping concepts: (market) liquidity and 
moneyness. Present if under-theorised in the literature on safe assets (Golec 
and Perotti, 2017, van Riet 2017) and in central bank speeches (Potter 
20182), the distinction can be traced back to monetary theories that treat 
money as a claim (see Goodhart 1999) and financial systems as sets of 
hierarchical claims (Mehrling 2010, Pozsar 2014, Gabor and Vestergaard 
2016). At the top of a hierarchy sit debt instruments that are used as means 
of payment (cash, bank deposits), supporting layers of assets of varying 
moneyness (Mehrling 2010).  
 
																																																								2	Potter	(2018)	distinguishes	between	money-like	and	safe	assets.	Safe	assets	‘lack	of	actual	and	perceived	exposure	to	risk’	(credit,	counterparty,	interest-rate,	and	market	risk).	In	contrast,	money-likeness	‘refers	to	an	asset’s	lack	of	information	sensitivity,	such	that,	when	it	is	used	in	transactions,	economic	agents	need	not	worry	about	its	future	value,	at	least	in	the	short	term	and	in	most	states	of	the	world’.		The	information-sensitivity	framing	aside,	the	concept	of	‘money-likeness’,	similar	to	moneyness,	captures	the	promise	to	preserve	parity	to	cash.		
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Full moneyness captures the ability to convert an asset into higher money at 
par and on demand throughout financial cycles. In contrast, liquidity 
captures the ‘ability to buy or sell a product in a desired quantity and at a 
desired price and time without materially impacting the product’s price’3 
(IOSCO 2017: 2), that is, to convert tradable assets into payment money, at 
par or not, throughout financial cycles. The distinction is important to 
account for assets that are not liquid but acquire moneyness (such as sale 
and repurchase contracts) through evolutionary changes in finance (Minsky 
1957). 
 
Consider bank deposits. Behind a demand deposit sits a promise to pay 
depositors cash at par on demand, that is, to convert bank promises to pay 
into state promises. The strength of bank promises – their moneyness – 
ultimately depends on the state (Chick 1996, Gabor and Vestergaard 2016, 
also Cœuré 2016). In part, this is a chartalist story where states confer 
moneyness to bank deposits by accepting these to settle tax liabilities 
(Ingham 2004). But this is not the entire story. Rather, banks’ promises 
become credible once the state creates legal and institutional mechanisms 
for preserving moneyness: a social contract to support par convertibility of 
bank deposits anchored in lender of last resort (LOLR) and deposit 
guarantees in exchange for banking regulation (Goodhart 1989, Chick 1993, 
Cœuré 2016). The need for bank regulation points to banks as creators of 
safe assets through lending activities – loans create deposits - rather than 
simple intermediaries of savings in the economy (Bank of England 2014). 
Regulation seeks to ensure that banks do not put their ability to issue safe 
assets in the service of excessive leverage.  
 
Yet bank money is ill-suited to meet the safety needs of financialised 
globalization. This is no longer a world populated by banks with long-term 
lending practices needing stable retail deposits but a world increasingly 
organized around securities and derivative markets, involving a plethora of 
market participants with varying time horizons and investment strategies. It 
is the world of (global) market-based banks with activities in securities and 
derivative markets, as proprietary traders and market-makers (Lindo 2013, 																																																								3	Note	here	that	retail	bank	deposits	offer	funding	but	not	market	liquidity.	A	bank	deposit	is	not	tradable	in	that	this	is	a	debt	relationship	between	two	entities,	the	bank	and	the	depositor.	Once	the	depositor	uses	it	to	pay	for	goods	and	services,	the	relationship	is	dissolved,	and	the	bank	deposit	disappears.	In	turn,	a	security	(government	bond)	can	change	hands	repeatedly.		
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Hardie et al 2013, Gabor 2015, Gabor and Ban 2016). Driven by 
evolutionary changes linked to increasing income inequality and the 
growing replacement of the welfare state with private provision for future 
uncertainties (pensions and insurance), this is also the world of institutional 
investors (pension funds, insurance companies and multinational 
corporations) and their asset managers (OFR 2013, Haldane 2014, Braun 
2016b). For leveraged investors and institutional cash pools, bank deposits 
loose moneyness above the deposit guarantee. So they turn to seek safety in 
tradable securities and secured debt instruments (Pozsar 2011).  
 
In this world, the distinction between moneyness and liquidity becomes 
apparent: investors are able to convert liquid securities into cash on demand, 
but not necessarily at par. The distinction matters less for a slowly dying 
breed in modern financial markets, that of patient investors that hold 
securities to maturity when they convert at par (unless the issuer defaults). 
In contrast, active investors (trading desks of universal banks, hedge funds, 
bond funds, other asset managers) need liquid securities that can be easily 
converted into cash to make profit from daily changes in the securities’ 
price or to deal with sudden outflows. Investors particularly value liquidity 
when markets are volatile (Vayanos 2004).  
 
Consider an asset manager whose daily cash flows reflect potential sudden 
redemptions and margin maintenance related to derivative trading across 
different currencies and asset classes. Wishing to avoid exposure to banks 
above the deposit guarantee and without access to central bank balance 
sheets, it looks for safety down the hierarchy of debt claims, where it has 
several options: short-term (shadow) debt, securities, and repurchase 
agreements (See Table 1). 
 
Money market funds shares with constant net asset value (CNAV) constitute 
the closest substitute to bank deposits. CNAV MMF shares have no 
liquidity but high moneyness, supported by regulatory regimes and 
accounting rules that allow money market funds ‘to quote their shares as 
stable net asset value’ (Baklanova 2009, Gelpern and Gerding 2016, p.13). 
This is a promise to investors that they can redeem shares at par. Without 
direct state support, this promise turned illusory in in the wake of Lehman, 
prompting regulators to restrict the CNAV label to those funds that invest in 
government securities.  Thus, the par promise of MMF shares ultimately 
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reflects the safety of the assets that MMFs invest in: bank deposits, 
securities and repos.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 Assets: determinants of liquidity, moneyness, safety 
Asset Market liquidity
  
Moneyness Safety 
Base money 
(central 
bank) 
Traded in interbank 
markets  
Full moneyness, only 
available to banks.  
*Under pressure 
during balance of 
payment crises   
Bank deposit None (not tradable) Convertibility into cash 
at par on demand (up to 
deposit guarantee cap) 
*deposit guarantees 
and lender of last 
resort 
Money market 
fund shares 
None (not tradable) Convertibility into cash 
at par on demand 
* CNAV regulations 
Government 
securities 
A function of size, 
market infrastructure 
(market-making and 
repo markets), credit 
rating, regulatory 
treatment. 
Limited (short-term 
government bills) 
*Central bank direct 
support (market-
maker of last resort) 
*‘Exorbitant’ 
privilege, regional 
curse  
 
Private 
securities, 
including 
securitized 
instruments 
A function of size, 
market infrastructure 
(market-making and 
repo markets), credit 
rating, regulatory 
treatment. 
Little to none  *Central bank direct 
support 
 
Repurchase 
agreements 
None (not tradable) Monetary power of 
collateral rests on 
collateral valuation 
*Central bank direct 
support for market 
price of collateral 
*Central bank repo 
collateral practices 
 
Tradable securities lie on a spectrum of liquidity. At one end are short-term 
government bonds, at the other, securitized instruments and high-yield 
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corporate bonds. In between lie private debt securities, ranging from 
corporate bonds to (asset-backed) commercial paper and covered bonds.  
 
The finance literature treats short-term government debt as the safest 
tradable assets, endowed with both liquidity and moneyness. Short-term 
bills are issued as a discount to par, and do not pay coupon.  Devoid of 
interest rate risk, T-bills offer ‘absolute security’ that the state will repay 
nominal return at maturity (Golec and Perotti 2017), offering institutional 
investors monetary services comparable to bank deposits (Greenwood, 
Hanson and Stein 2010, Golec and Perotti 2017). Yet a closer look at the 
Tbill market microstructure literature suggests that, paradoxically, not even 
T-bills of the same maturity but different age are equally liquid. For instance 
a 2 months security issued last month is typically less liquid than a two 
month security issued last week, as the newest issued security becomes the 
benchmark –known as on the run securities –for pricing in that maturity 
bucket (see Biais et al 2004 for European Tbills, Babbel et al 2006 and 
Clark and Mann 2016 for the US). Dealers have no obligation to quote the 
older, off the run, Tbills or bonds, and rarely trade them with each other 
(Musto et al 2017).  Off-the-run securities are rarely traded, sitting instead 
in the portfolio of investors until maturity. The on-the-run premium is 
higher at longer maturities (see Fleming 2001), and increases during periods 
of market volatility (Musto et al 2017). Even investors deemed patient, such 
as insurance companies, prefer the safety provided by on-the-run securities 
during bad times.  
 
These liquidity dynamics are exacerbated in smaller government markets. 
Intuitively, a government’s ability to issue debt at low and stable costs 
reflects its fiscal probity, and therefore safety should depend on the 
fundamentals of the issuer. For instance, lower-rated sovereigns cannot tap 
into the demand of institutional investors restricted by their mandates, even 
when regulation is designed to incentivize demand for government debt 
(think Basel III). Yet paradoxically, small states planning to balance budgets 
risk illiquidity by reducing volumes available to trade in secondary markets. 
Size breeds liquidity (IMF 2001).  
 
The architecture of market-making also matters. Most securities enter 
financial life through the balance sheet of a handful of primary dealers, 
mostly banks that organize primary issuance, stand ready to buy and sell and 
thus provide e liquidity (Lindo 2013). In practice, primary dealers’ 
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commitment to liquidity is neither crisis nor manipulation proof. For 
instance, during the early 1990s, Salomon Brothers in the US and Citibank 
in Italy abused their government securities market-making privileges to 
capture market share or increase profits (MacKenzie 2006, Gabor 2016). In 
crisis, market-makers can do little to reverse firesales of government bonds, 
since that have limited capacity to weather mark-to-market losses. Greece or 
Portugal in Europe, and many emerging countries are good examples of the 
limits to market-making.  
 
Government debt remains safe as long as the central bank stands ready to 
intervene when market liquidity evaporates as market-makers of last resort 
(Buiter and Sibert 2007, Gourinchas and Jeanne 2012, Gabor 2016). The 
intervention requires careful balancing when it evolves into a full 
quantitative easing program, as QE risks depriving market participants of 
safe assets. The argument, often invoked by central banks (see Potter 2018), 
that QE swaps one safe asset, sovereign bonds, for another, central bank 
reserves, only holds for those few institutions (mainly banks) that have 
direct access to the central bank’s reserves. Central bank reserves are safe 
assets for banks, government bonds for a larger set of financial institutions, 
including institutional cash pools. 
 
Market-maker of last resort may not be necessary for those sovereign bonds 
that are targeted by flight to safety, as financial institutions that abandon 
volatile asset markets need to herd somewhere. Yet the exorbitant privilege 
of being safe asset issuer for the rest of the world may come with trade-offs. 
Gourinchas and Rey (2016) introduce the ‘curse of the regional safe asset 
provider’ to capture a trade-off for smaller countries between validating the 
foreign demand for safe assets via a larger external balance sheet (with 
potential valuation losses from global shocks) or restricting the supply of 
safe assets at the cost of exchange rate appreciations. While the curse shows 
up in data for Switzerland, the paper documents how Germany’s EMU 
membership allowed it to escape the curse altogether.   
 
For many asset managers, the monetary services provided by repos are often 
preferable to those of government bonds (BIS 2017). Asset managers often 
treat repos as ‘cash accounts’ whose maturity can be dovetailed to planned 
cash outflows. Repo is the money of shadow-banking, of financial systems 
organized around securities and derivative markets, populated by 
institutions whose business models rely on daily variation in the price of 
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securities/derivative contracts (Gabor 2018, see Moreira and Savov 2014, 
Ricks 2016, Murrau 2017 for a broader definition). While repos are not 
tradable, their issuers have perfected a mechanism for constructing 
moneyness that revolves around collateral valuation (Gabor and Vestergaard 
2016).  
 
Repos are conventionally portrayed, in both orthodox (see Moreira and 
Savov 2017) and alternative accounts (Murrau 2017), as contracts that 
involve the sale and promise to repurchase of tradable securities known as 
collateral. For instance, bank A sells a portfolio of securities to an asset 
manager, with a promise to buy these back at a further point in time. But 
this framing essentially neglects to engage a monetary role for repos. Why 
this matters becomes immediately apparent when treating repos as balance 
sheet relationships.  
 
Again, Bank A seeks leverage by purchasing a portfolio of sovereign bonds, 
for proprietary trading or for market-making (see Figure 1). To fund this 
portfolio, it finds an asset manager that holds her cash in a deposit with 
Bank B, but is worried about the unsecured exposure above the deposit 
guarantee. Shadow money creation simultaneously solves the leverage and 
safety demands. The asset manager moves her deposit from Bank B to Bank 
A. Bank A accepts a new liability (the bank deposit) and a new asset 
(central bank reserves) from bank B, using the latter to purchase sovereign 
bonds (Step 2). Next, the asset manager’s bank deposit is converted into 
shadow money (step 3). Bank A replaces the unsecured promise to pay (the 
bank deposit) with a promise to pay secured by collateral (repo deposit). 
Bank A grows its balance sheet by funding new assets with a shadow 
deposit issued to the asset manager, on which it pays interest. The asset 
manager does not, in Minsky’s (1957) words ‘earn the interest accruals on 
the "purchased" debt instruments, …rather a stated contractual interest’ (p. 
176) on the shadow deposit it holds with Bank A.  
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Figure 1 Shadow money creation 
 
 
When the repo matures, bank A makes good on its promise to convert 
shadow money back into the bank deposit, by repurchasing collateral 
securities (Figure 2, step 4). If those securities have not matured, the bank 
and the asset manager can agree to roll-over the repo. Bank A can trade 
securities without traditional money creation, and the asset manager 
provides credit via the shadow deposit without trading the securities. 
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Figure 2 Shadow money at maturity 
 
Moneyness is created via two mechanisms: the legal treatment of collateral 
and the valuation of collateral. Thus, shadow money separates legal and 
economic ownership of collateral. The asset manager becomes legal owner 
so it can liquidate collateral in crisis when bank A can no longer make good 
on its promise to convert shadow money into bank money. The bank 
remains the economic owner entitled to the interest payments on collateral 
securities. 
 
Furthermore, moneyness is not simply a question of the type of collateral, as 
Moreira and Savov (2014) assume when identifying repos collateralised 
with sovereign bonds as money. What matters is how collateral is managed. 
Moneyness rests on collateral valuation practices: for repos beyond 
overnight, the two parties check daily that the market value of collateral 
preserves parity to the shadow deposit. Should the market price of collateral 
increase above the shadow deposit, as it occurs during asset bubbles, the 
bank makes a margin call to recover the difference in cash (or collateral). It 
can use that collateral to expand leverage further by issuing new shadow 
money. Collateral valuation aims to ensure that the repo deposit can be 
converted into cash at par at maturity or when the borrower defaults and the 
asset manager sells collateral. Through valuation, collateral is critical to 
repo moneyness, and therefore safety.  
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Therein lies the monetary power of collateral securities: liquid collateral 
requires less effort to preserve moneyness since lower price volatility 
reduces need for margin calls. The monetary power of collateral erodes with 
collateral illiquidity, since it requires issuers of shadow money to find 
additional collateral/cash to preserve moneyness.  
 
Thus, shadow deposit creation inextricably entangles moneyness and 
collateral liquidity. The more shadow deposits issued during good times, the 
higher the demand for, and therefore liquidity, of collateral securities (ECB 
2002, Gabor 20164). In turn, falling asset prices test the monetary power of 
collateral. The architecture of moneyness – collateral valuation – 
simultaneously depends on and cannibalizes liquidity in crisis. If collateral 
securities fall in price, bank A above needs to find additional collateral or 
cash to preserve parity between the shadow deposit and the bank deposit 
promised. If it cannot, it has to fire sale assets, in turn eroding market 
liquidity and triggering further margin calls in what Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen (2009) termed liquidity spirals. Safety is threatened in crisis 
through a second mechanism: banks take refuge in highest quality collateral 
to preserve funding via shadow deposits (Gabor and Ban 2016, Gabor and 
Vestergaard 2016).  
 
Since collateral liquidity relies on central bank interventions, it becomes 
clear that even repos secured by government bonds have no strong claim to 
safety without appropriate central bank support, despite claims to the 
contrary (Perotti and Golec 2017). But the type of central bank support 
matters. Not all crisis interventions have stabilizing effects on the entangled 
relationship between shadow money and securities markets. Paradoxically, 
lender of last resort interventions can erode the monetary power of 
collateral, and therefore the safety of shadow money. The mechanics works 
as follows: if banks issue shadow money to get access to emergency central 
bank reserves, then the terms on which the central bank accepts and 
manages collateral become critical. If central banks seek safety via collateral 
valuation, they will call margins when collateral prices fall, thus increasing 
banks’ funding pressure and firesales (Gabor and Ban 2016, Gabor 2016). 																																																								4	It	was	this	repo/collateral	liquidity	nexus	that	central	bankers	cited	when	encouraging	repo	markets	before	Lehman	(CGFS	1999).	Repos	would	turn	the	fiction	of	safety	into	reality	in	core	bond	markets,	a	market-based	solution	that	placed	the	onus	of	preserving	safety	in	global	financial	markets	on	market-making	banks	(Gabor	2016).	
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Thus, central banks’ collateral policies can impair collateral securities’ 
liquidity (Barthelmy et al 2017). In financial systems organized around 
securities/derivative markets, lender of last resort only works in conjunction 
with dealer/market-maker of last resort interventions in core collateral 
markets (Buiter and Sibert 2007, Mehrling 2010) to support market prices 
(Gabor 2016). Market maker of last resort simultaneously provides liquidity 
to sovereign securities and moneyness to shadow deposits. 
 
The entanglement between shadow money and sovereign bonds poses 
complex challenges in polities with narrow interpretations of central bank 
independence, where interventions are subject to complex political 
pressures. These pressures reflect the (monetarist) separation between the 
state institutions that are central to the issuance and preservation of safe 
assets: the central bank and the Ministry of Finance/Treasury. That this need 
not create insurmountable political difficulties is clear from the example of 
the Bank of England, that has adopted formally market-maker of last resort 
without any political opposition (Gabor 2016). In contrast, nowhere have 
these pressures been stronger, or more destabilizing, than in the EMU.  
 
 
National vs single safe assets  
 
Even before the creation of the euro, European technocrats took the question 
of safe assets seriously. They hoped the Euro would accelerate the transition 
to a securities-based financial system, viewed as the crucial ingredient of the 
impressive US productivity growth in the 1990s. Baron Lamfallussy, the 
president of the European Monetary Institute, forerunner to ECB, noted the 
critical role that liquid sovereign securities would play in anchoring 
financial stability:   
 
‘We've seen an accelerated move to a market-centric system from 
the bank-centric system that has tended to prevail in Europe," 
Lamfalussy said in London last month. "I have no doubt that a 
market-centric system is more efficient, but there's a question 
whether it is stable." The key to stability, he concludes - for the 
pricing of corporate as well as public debt - is a liquid and 
transparent government debt market.’      Euromoney, 1999 
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While European technocrats discussed the market-driven integration of 
government bond markets, Member States had good reasons to fight over 
the challenges that EMU posed for their debt’s safe asset (Keating 1996, 
McCauley and White 1997). Issuing debt jointly, however structurally 
necessary, turned out politically impossible. Instead, with currency risk 
removed, states faced the harsh reality of having to compete for investors, 
competition that took them beyond traditional clients, the local banking 
system. The first Member State to acquire the prized status of benchmark 
for pricing private euro securities would derive important liquidity benefits 
and become de facto safe asset issuer (Keating 1996). ‘It would be a mistake 
to underestimate the power of the particular interests engaged in the ultimate 
structure of the euro area government bond market’, noted McCauley (1999, 
p12).  
 
France made the first claim for the safe asset issuer crown. Having lost the 
battle to impose its more Keynesian view of monetary policy to the German 
view of sound money, France announced that it would model its sovereign 
debt market after the US. It would redenominate old and newly issued 
sovereign bonds into Euros, introduce auction calendars and liberalise the 
creation of shadow euros against French securities collateral. At first, 
Germany did not respond. A Bundesbank mistrustful of short-term finance 
refused to issue short-term government debt, while maintaining an 
unpredictable auction calendar and a tight rein on shadow money creation 
backed by bunds (Trampusch 2015; Gabor 2016).  
 
Eventually, the appeal of safe asset status proved irresistible. By 1997, 
Bundesbank entered the race, describing ‘an increasing level of competition 
between sovereign issuers and between leading financial centers in Europe 
for the favor of international investors’, so ‘the answer will be determined 
not only by the financial policies of the countries participating in the 
monetary union… a much more central role will be played by each nation’s 
debt management’ as ‘international investors will favor the markets that 
offer them a complete selection of maturities and sufficient liquidity in each 
issue’ (Euromoney, 1997). In this debate, Germany accepted that liquidity 
mattered more than fiscal probity for safe asset status.  
 
Italy aside, other Member States had smaller government bond markets 
where liquidity could prove challenging once they joined the monetary 
union. Yet up to 2008, such worries did not materialise. EMU countries, 
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small and large, saw their sovereign debt increasingly held by non-residents 
(Figure 3). Thereafter, everything changed in EMU government bond 
markets. Between Lehman’s collapse and the September 2012 ‘whatever it 
takes’ commitment, non-residents reduce their demand for periphery 
sovereign debt, even of those countries that maintained investment grade 
(Spain and Italy), moving to the safety of German and French assets. In 
turn, Member States relied less on home banks to generate demand (Figure 
4). Their share fell until 2008, to recover since, particular for ‘periphery’ 
Member States, prompting a wave of public concerns about, and demands to 
subdue, the ‘sovereign-bank loop’. Yet it should be noticed that banks 
demand for home bonds is not simply a matter of moral suasion from 
governments reluctant to subject themselves to the discipline of the market. 
As the crisis demonstrated, and Cœuré noted, imperfect markets are poor 
enforcers of discipline. Rather, banks’ demand for the home sovereign 
should be understood as a combination of pragmatic geopolitics (the 
sovereign remains the true lender of last resort should the Euro collapse) 
and profit-seeking.  
 
The picture became more complicated once the ECB adopted negative 
interest rates and announced QE in February 2015. By 2016, the sovereign 
debt of large countries (Germany, France, Italy) was trading at negative 
yields, and market participants decried the scarcity of Bunds inflicted by QE 
(later remedied by Bundesbank via bund lending). It is important to note 
that although negative yields suggest that investors pay Member States for 
the privilege of lending them money, this is only the case for those holding 
to maturity. Investors can make profit if they hold negative yielding 
securities for a few days, selling when price increases.   
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Figure 3 Non-resident holdings of EMU sovereign debt 
 
Figure 4 Resident bank holdings of EMU government debt 
 
 
 
 
The crisis illustrated powerfully that the sum is greater than its parts in 
EMU macrofinance. A collection of national safe assets does not make a 
single safe asset. EMU entered the banking crisis with eight AAA rated 
sovereigns, and exited the sovereign debt crisis with three (Coeure 2016). 
The following section explores the role played by the ECB’s attempts to 
create a single safe asset via shadow banking (see Table 2).  
 
Table 2 Governing through markets: the single safe asset case 
 How  Problems 
Shadow euros 
 
 
 
 
 
public-private 
*ECB accepts shadow euros 
issued on equal terms against 
any EMU sovereign collateral. 
Markets to follow suit. 
* ECB collateral valuation for 
shadow euros 
* Shadow euros fragility without 
appropriate ECB support (OMT) 
*Strengthens bund safe asset role 
STS securities via 
Capital Markets 
Union  
 
fully private 
*rules for simple, transparent 
and standardized (STS) 
securitization  
*preferential regulatory 
treatment and ECB support 
(collateral framework) 
*small market 
*illusive market liquidity without 
ECB support 
Sovereign-Bond 
Backed Securities 
(SBBSies) 
 
*bundle EMU sovereign debt, 
issue senior safe and junior 
tranche 
 
* joint liability 
*sovereign-bank loop 
*liquidity impact on (periphery) 
sovereigns 
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public-private 
 
 
The shadow euro – a fragile single safe asset 
 
The Euro was born during  a period of significant structural change and 
fragility in global finance. The Committee for Global Financial System 
diagnosed the 1998 LTCM/Russian crises as crises of financial systems 
increasingly organised around securities and derivatives markets (CGFS 
1999). Central banks running the Committee called for policies to cement 
the safe asset status of government bonds. Reluctant to contemplate direct 
interventions undermining their independence, central banks turned to 
shadow money (Gabor 2016). Shadow money creation would increase 
demand for quality collateral, allowing market-making banks to fund 
positions easily and arbitrageurs to short. All these would increase 
securities’ liquidity and safety.   
 
ECB saw in shadow euros a pragmatic solution to the faults in the EMU 
architecture. Until (if ever) EMU states agreed on joint liabilities, shadow 
euros would increase the liquidity and safety of sovereign bonds issued 
nationally. The EBC worried little about the conditions under which the 
safety of the single repo asset would come under pressure. Rather, it framed 
shadow euros as a mere vehicle for improving the liquidity – hence the 
safety – of national government bonds.  
 
How could shadow euros achieve what politics failed to do?  The ECB 
(2002) proposed to harness the special nature of repo, connecting securities 
markets with money markets, derivatives and swap markets. Private 
financial institutions would create shadow euros against a general collateral 
basket that included all EMU sovereign debt, of different liquidity and 
underlying fiscal positions, on equal terms. Shadow euros would increase 
demand, and liquidity for government collateral. The ambition was for say a 
German pension fund to find safety into a shadow deposit secured by Greek 
sovereign collateral (see Gabor and Ban 2016). The European Commission 
put its law-making powers in the service of the shadow euro project 
(Giovannini Report 1999). Member States would benefit, the technocratic 
consensus suggested, should shadow money issued nationally become a true 
shadow euro created through a single repo market. Euros and shadow euros 
came into being simultaneously.  
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The ECB (2002) used its monetary policy framework to support private 
shadow euro creation. It decided to implement monetary policy by asking 
banks to issue shadow money in order to borrow central bank reserves. In 
doing so, it broke with the tradition of Member State central banks, which 
did use collateral valuation practices that render shadow money fragile. The 
ECB’s repo collateral framework treated all Euro sovereign debt equally, 
and private repo markets followed where the ECB led (see Gabor and Ban 
2016). By 2008, this approach saw the single safe asset issued mainly by 
large European banks to fund aggressive expansion through dealer and 
market-making activities, brokerage services, and own account trading 
(Liikanen Report 2012). Shadow euro creation tripled in volumes by 2008 
to EUR 8 trillion, with issuance concentrated in the hands of large European 
banks. Banks used home and foreign sovereign collateral to fund leverage 
via shadow euro, just as the ECB had envisaged. This is an often-
underappreciated aspect of the sovereign-bank loop: the widespread belief 
that the debt of euro area sovereigns was interchangeable was in no small 
measure the outcome of market-based approaches to create a single safe 
asset.  
 
Yet the importance of an appropriate framework to support shadow money 
became painfully visible in the global financial crisis. First, the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers triggered a run on repo deposits (shadow dollars) created 
to fund leveraged positions in US shadow banking (Gorton and Metrick 
2012). The crisis of shadow money spread to EMU via the balance sheet of 
European banks. As European banks’ dollar funding problems travelled to 
Europe, both issuers and holders of shadow euros ran to the safety of the 
most liquid collateral. Holders of shadow deposits began discriminating 
between German and ‘periphery’ sovereign collateral (Hordahl and King 
2008). One after the other, the European clearinghouses that intermediated 
the bulk of shadow euro creation stopped accepting periphery sovereign 
collateral (Bank of England 2011). The single safe asset morphed into a core 
safe asset by middle of 2011. 
   
For readers familiar with the ECB’s crisis interventions, it would appear that 
the central bank did everything to defend both euros and shadow euros. The 
central bank stepped up the creation of its own safe asset by loosening 
LOLR terms. Banks could access central bank reserves by issuing shadow 
money against a broader set of collateral. This, to its critics, undermines 
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market discipline (Nyborg 2017). To its many supporters, the ECB offered 
banks an important lifeline given stress in wholesale funding markets, 
including repo markets (BIS 2013, Bindseil et al 2017). Yet scholars of 
ECB would do well to heed Minsky’s (1957) warning that the effectiveness 
of central bank actions needs to be judged by carefully examining 
evolutionary changes in finance. For European and foreign investors 
looking for safety in shadow euros rather than traditional bank deposits, the 
ECB’s treatment of shadow euros was not simply a matter of broader 
collateral. The ECM may have eased collateral acceptability rules (Greece 
aside) but it simultaneously abandoned the single approach that treated all 
EMU sovereign debt as equal collateral in shadow money creation (Gabor 
and Ban 2016). Its most important crisis tool, long-term refinancing 
operations (LTROs), followed pro-cyclical credit ratings and retained the 
collateral valuation practices that eroded the monetary power of periphery 
sovereign securities and rendered shadow money fragile. In providing 
extraordinary liquidity via runnable shadow money, the ECB could not 
defend the safety of private shadow euros. Rather, it reinforced the 
hierarchy of safety in the Eurozone.  
 
In one of the few ECB papers that confront this question, Bindseil et al 
(2017) reject Gabor and Ban (2016)’s claim that its collateral valuation 
increased market pressures on periphery sovereign bonds and diminished 
their monetary power. The ECB’s extended collateral framework, the 
argument goes, meant that in the aggregate banks had sufficient collateral to 
meet the ECB’s margin calls and haircut increase on periphery government 
debt collateral following credit downgrades. Put differently, banks had 
enough collateral to accommodate the fragile moneyness of shadow euros 
issued to the ECB. But what stands at aggregate level may be different at 
individual bank level, a point forcefully made by research from Banque de 
France:  
 
‘collateral constraints may have been binding at the bank level. In 
June 2012 […], 11% of the banks in our database had a utilization 
rate of their collateral pool greater than 90%, while 20% had a 
utilization rate greater than 80%. ..moreover, eligibility criteria may 
matter even for banks that are over-collateralised. The eligibility of 
certain assets as collateral is likely to impact their relative degree of 
liquidity compared with non-eligible assets and hence to alter the 
incentives to hold them’ (Barthélémy et al 2017).  
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The monetary power of periphery sovereign collateral also diminished. The 
discrimination in the ECB’s collateral framework between higher and 
lower-rated sovereigns (via haircuts and collateral valuation) reinforced the 
safe asset status of the former (bunds) to the detriment of the latter. Markets 
followed where the ECB led.  In 2010, LCH Clearnet, the largest clearer of 
shadow money in Europe, introduced a sovereign risk framework whereby 
the cost of funding with government bond collateral would increase as that 
bond yield went above Germany’s by more than 450 basis points (4.5%).  
For example, as yields on Irish government bonds increased in late 2010, 
LCH raised the costs of providing repo funding against Irish bond collateral, 
forcing banks to turn to lower-yielding bonds. It is no coincidence that 
Outright Monetary Transactions turned out to be the most effective tool to 
reinstate financial stability.  OMTs are in effect a market-making 
commitment to collateral market liquidity that supports safe asset status for 
periphery sovereign bonds and the moneyness of shadow euros.  
 
In sum, a safe asset lens changes dramatically the narrative of the EMU 
crisis. This is not simply a tale of fiscal irresponsibility and naïve investors. 
It is also a tale of global (shadow) banks extracting profit from daily 
variation in securities and derivatives prices, funded via runnable shadow 
money. Without appropriate support from the ECB through direct and 
immediate interventions to provide secure the monetary role of collateral, 
the shadow money solution to the single safe asset challenge failed.  
 
Could the ECB have done more given the constraints of its formal mandate 
and the reluctance in European capitals towards market-maker of last resort? 
While this question requires further research, it is important to note that 
although the ECB has the epistemic authority to shape the collective 
understanding of what went wrong in the European crisis, it has been 
reluctant to use it in order to clarify the role of the single repo market 
project. In constrast, the US Federal Reserve has produced a sizeable body 
of research and policy speeches on fragile repo (Gabor 2016, Murrau 2017). 
Rather, the ECB turned to deploy its epistemic authority on new market-
based solutions to the single safe asset challenge.  
 
 
The STS solution  
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Since the crisis, European technocrats have sought to engineer new  single 
safe assets. The Capital Market Union project prioritized the creation of a 
market for Simple, Transparent and Standardized (STS) securitization. 
Ostensibly, CMU aimed learning the lessons from the global financial crisis 
to revive European securitization markets. Working together, Bank of 
England and the ECB (2014) recognized that securitization markets played a 
critical role in the subprime mortgage market crisis and then the US 
financial crisis. The lesson the two central banks drew was not that 
securitization was fragile per se, but that incentives need to be aligned to 
remove the opacity and complexity that had caught investors by surprise, 
and to ensure that banks packaging illiquid loans had skin in the game.   
 
The timing, technologies and political economy of the STS process are 
critically examined in this special issue (Engelen and Glasmacher 2018; 
Braun and Hubner 2018, both in this issue).  Through a single safe asset 
angle, the STS process raises two important questions: could the STS 
generate sufficient volumes to become a meaningful contender for single 
safe asset status, and what would it take to make it safe?  
 
Both market participants and scholars have given skeptical answers to the 
first question. On the supply side, it will take a long time to establish a truly 
European securitisation market (see Thiemann and Lepoutre 2017). Barriers 
to pooling loans across borders need to be removed before German SME 
loans and Greek SME loans share the same STS security. Although 
European institutions framed the STS process as a lifeline for credit-starved 
SMEs, the ECB’s surveys show that SMEs in Europe are more concerned 
about finding demand for their products, and less about financing. 
Furthermore, SMEs perform better in countries with a large number of small 
banks, such as cooperative banks, so that old boring banking rather than 
capital markets will continue to be, in the medium to long term, the answer 
to SME financing needs. The plans to recruit public development banks to 
the task by encouraging them to securitise SME/infrastructure loans may 
increase supply, but at the risk of chipping away at the very logic of 
development banking (see Mertens and Thiemann this issue). If past 
experience offers any guidance, then securitization will most likely rely on 
mortgage or consumer lending, yet again threatening bubbles. It will be 
paradoxical if STS rules will need to allow bubble-prone underlying assets 
to fill the gap left by Germany’s ‘black zero’ views on fiscal policy. 
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To stimulate demand, central banks pledged to treat STS securities as high-
quality collateral. This would assist banks in their STS market-making role, 
allowing them to tap central bank funding by issuing shadow euros against 
STS collateral. But the failure of shadow euros after Lehman clearly 
suggests that the monetary power of collateral is not simply a question of 
preferential inclusion in central banks collateral frameworks. Should STS be 
downgraded, or experience price volatility, the ECB’s collateral valuation 
would immediately affect the liquidity of STS collateral (see Gabor and Ban 
2016, Barthélémy et al, 2017). The only way to make STS safe is through 
direct central bank interventions to support STS market liquidity.  
 
Yet European technocrats appear unwilling to learn this valuable lesson 
from the pre-crisis shadow euro experiment. Rather, the European 
Commission’s (2015) Green paper, and the Bank of England and the ECB 
(2014), suggest that institutional investors would be the ultimate stabilizing 
force. Investors with low leverage and little dependency on short-term 
funding, and with ‘buy to hold’ strategies, would make STS safe. Treating 
STS securities as ‘High Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA)’ in Basel III rules 
would also improve its claim to safe asset. Yet a critical macro-finance lens 
throws doubt on this narrative. Institutional investors look for safety into 
STS securities that trade in liquid markets, particularly if accounting rules 
require assets to be valued at market prices. Accounting rules create 
incentives for insurance companies and pension funds to buy during good 
times and sell during bad times (Haldane 2014).   
 
Recognizing the importance of exposure to daily volatility in the market 
price of (STS) securities, market participants stressed that only central banks 
can make STS securities truly safe by market-making (purchasing) of last 
resort. As the Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME), one of 
the key lobby groups in the CMU process, put it: 
 
…an ABS purchase program for qualifying securitisations with the 
Central Banks acting as "purchasers of last resort", could underpin 
banks' market making activities, sending a powerful message to 
encourage more active participation in the market. After all, the bulk 
of losses on European securitisation incurred during 2007-08 were 
due to mark-to-market requirements rather than actual credit losses. 
(AFME 2014, p. 9) 
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Less bound by EMU politics, Bank of England could have fulfilled AFME’s 
vision via its new market-maker of last resort commitment for core assets. 
This liquidity guarantee, it was argued above, preserves the safe asset status 
of both those assets and shadow money issued against them. Brexit puts the 
burden of STS safety on the ECB’s shoulders, leaving it alone to confront 
complex questions of distribution underpinning market-maker of last resort.  
The ESM as a European Monetary Fund solution promoted by Germany is 
equally problematic. In a world where safety is time-critical, that is, it can 
be destroyed in a matter of minutes, hours and at most days, an EMF 
intervention subject to complex conditionality and political negotiations can 
do little to prevent private or sovereign assets from loosing their safe status. 
At best, the EMF will function to restore safe asset status while inflicting 
painful austerity on countries whose sovereign bonds may have lost their 
monetary power with little contribution from the underlying fiscal position.   
 
 
The SBBSies solution 
 
In contrast to the STS process, the SBBSies solution puts sovereign bonds 
back at the core of the single safe asset debate. It identifies joint guarantees 
as the critical political obstacle to Eurobonds, and proposes to overcome it 
by the magic of financial engineering (Brunnermeier et al 2011, 2016, van 
den Riet 2017). A supranational vehicle would buy government bonds, 
package and securitise them into two distinctive tranches. The larger senior 
tranche, amounting to 70% of the portfolio, would become the single safe 
asset, the synthetic Eurobond. The junior tranche, offering higher yield for 
higher risks, would take the first losses. Senior bond holders would be 
exposed to credit risk only once losses reach more than 30% would 
(Minnenna 20175). Thus, sovereign bonds with different risk profiles (say 
German and Greek) would be bundled together to generate a safe asset via a 
market process. This is a revival of the pre-crisis approach.  Securitization 
markets replace shadow money in the private-public partnership to generate 
the single safe asset.   
 																																																								5	https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2017/04/25/2187829/guest-post-why-esbies-wont-solve-the-euro-areas-problems/	
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While the SBBSies process has been powered from Frankfurt with support 
in Brussels, the engine was the European Systemic Risk Board rather than 
the ECB6. The European Commission’s (2017) White Paper on deepening 
the EMU frames the urgency of SBBSies as follows. The EMU state’s 
individual ability to use fiscal policy is greatly limited by two factors. The 
sovereign-bank loop exposes public finances to the misfortunes of home 
banks and vice-versa. Furthermore, uncertain market access limits the 
ability of Member States to use fiscal policy in a counter-cyclical fashion, ‘a 
major explanation behind the severe dent in the recovery in the years 2011-
2013’ (p.13). Belatedly accepting the contractionary effects of austerity that 
it pushed as part of the Troika, the Commission urged the completion of the 
Banking and Capital Markets Union, together with a ‘very innovative’ 
instrument, the SBBSies. The financial stability benefits of gradually 
neutering the sovereign-bank loop would solve the political impasse 
delaying the Banking Union (Braun 2018). 
 
Why would Germany accept the structured version of Eurobonds that, if 
successful, could wrest away the bund’s privileged position in the Eurozone 
financial architecture?  The European Commission (2017) indicates to the 
politics of German’s position towards synthetic Eurobonds. For Germany, 
the critical flaw in the Banking Union plans, and the reason for its 
reluctance to agree to a common Deposit Guarantee (EDIS), remains the 
sovereign-bank nexus. To break it,  Germany requires risk weights on 
sovereign debt or a ceiling on banks’ holding of home sovereign debt. Yet 
Member States who have seen the monetary power of their sovereign bonds 
suffer in crisis have opposed such measures, well aware that the current 
EMU architecture exposes them to time-critical fragilities that the ECB, or 
the European Stability Mechanism, would address only with conditionalities 
attached. According to the Commission (2017), SBBSies can reconcile the 
two. Changes in the regulatory treatment of sovereign bonds would not be 
necessary because banks would shift some of their portfolio from home 
sovereign into SBBSies.  
 
The shadow euro’s brief history as single safe asset provides important 
lessons. Shadow euros generated broad political support before 2008 
because of a double promise: moneyness for shadow money and liquidity 																																																								6	It	is	important	to	note	that	some	Eurosystem	central	bank	governors	have	been	important	figures	in	the	ESRB’s	Safe	Asset	Working	Group.		
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for the underlying (sovereign) collateral. SBBSies do not engender this 
(cyclically-valid) claim. Italy, a vocal opponent of SBBSies, illustrates the 
predicament. The more periphery sovereign bonds the SBBS process locks 
away in securitization vehicles, the less secondary market trading, and 
liquidity. According to estimates, SBBSies would nearly eliminate 
secondary markets for some sovereign issuers with small markets 
(Minnenna 2017). Furthermore and paradoxically, the stronger the safe asset 
status of the SBBSs – eventually with the ECB backstopping it - the less 
collateral-related demand for Italian bonds. The SBBSies alone cannot 
resolve the trade-off between a market-engineered single safe asset and the 
liquidity of individual sovereign bond markets. Only a political solution for 
the ECB will.  
 
Conclusion  
 
Three plans constitute the post-crisis vision that the European Commission 
has launched to address the weaknesses of the EMU governance 
architecture: completion of the banking union, launch of a capital markets 
union (CMU), and issuance of Sovereign Bond Backed Securities 
(SSBSies). At the core of these plans, is the notion that a pan-European 
“single safe asset” – widely held to be necessary to anchor European finance 
as well as to enable the transmission of monetary policy across the 
Eurozone – can be created in and through new forms of securitization in 
European shadow banking. The role of European authorities in facilitating 
the creation of a single safe asset varies across the initiatives. In the CMU, 
which envisages the engineering of safe assets through the creation of a 
market for Simple, Transparent and Standardized securitization, public 
authorities would offer preferential regulatory treatment, facilitate the 
process through various standardizing and transparency enhancing 
initiatives, while the central bank would put its collateral framework in 
service of the process.  In the case of SBBSies, the project is to create a 
public-private safe asset, involving central banks actively in the process. In 
both cases, the presumption of the Commission, and the majority of the 
scholarly literature, is that the ECB will not be required backstop the 
safeness of these assets.  
Through a critical macro-finance approach, we argue the contrary to be true. 
Ultimately, a safe asset is only safe to the extent that it enjoys backstopping 
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support from a central bank, in the form of market-maker of last resort 
interventions. Only such interventions can simultaneously provide liquidity 
to sovereign securities and moneyness to shadow deposits, both of which 
are crucial prerequisites of financial stability. By failing to learn this 
valuable lesson from the European sovereign debt crisis – which only abated 
once the ECB committed to backstopping the collateral values of all 
Eurozone sovereign debt, in and through the OMT programme – the 
technocratic vision for future Euro governance remain mired in the same 
contradictions and denials that has haunted it since the late 1990s. There can 
be no integration of European finance and smooth transmission of monetary 
policy, without a genuinely pan-European Central Bank, that is prepared to 
guarantee the safety of a single European safe asset, by formally and fully 
adopting a mandate for market-making in safe assets. 
 
The efforts to create a single safe asset for the EMU have been so far 
unsuccesful. Relying on market discipline is not a solution since ‘market 
discipline has destroyed safe assets more than it has created them’ (Cœuré 
2016). A national solution to the single safe asset problem reduces room for 
countercyclical fiscal policies where needed, and increases it where 
countries are reluctant to use them. The burden of adjustment should fall on 
the ECB: to first ensure that EMU returns to a safe shadow euro again and 
second, to follow Bank of England in the formal adoption of a market-
maker of last resort function. It remains for future scholars to explore the 
extent to which these new functions entrench moral hazard and the political 
power of the ECB. Structurally, EMU financial markets require a single safe 
asset.   
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